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I. Introduction
Private Investments in Public Equities (PIPEs) represent a relatively inexpensive and
efficient means for a publicly-traded company to obtain additional capital fumding. PIPE
transactions usually involve investments of less than $100 million and are usually made by
sophisticated investors in private transactions. PIPE financings in the United States totaled
$24.7 billion in 2000, $15.2 billion in 2001, and $12.3 billion in 2002.' However, PIPE
transactions have not enjoyed the same level of popularity in Europe as in the United States,
in large part because the legal and regulatory framework in many European jurisdictions
hinder the ease with which such transactions can be completed. Nonetheless, the European
landscape is changing and, as current market conditions preclude many companies from
accessing traditional public and private sources of financing, PIPEs offer an alternative for
European companies seeking to raise capital.
The purpose of this article is to highlight the different strategies required to complete a
PIPE transaction in key European jurisdictions given the differences in the local regulatory
regimes.
H. Overview of PIPE Transactions
PIPE transactions first gained favor among sophisticated investors in the United States
in the early 1990s. In a PIPE transaction, a public company will sell newly issued securities
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1. Placement Tracker Statistics, available at http://www.PlacementTracker.com (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
No statistical information is available on European PIPE transactions. However, available market data indicates
that public companies in many countries, including Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Swe-
den, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and England have completed PIPEs.
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of the same class as its listed securities to an investor or group of investors pursuant to a
private placement.2 As part of the arrangement, a company will generally undertake to
ensure that the privately-placed securities will become freely tradable within a relatively
short time-perhaps ninety days or less after the closing of the transaction-a feature that
makes PIPEs particularly appealing to private investors because it provides a potentially
quicker and easier exit from the investment than other forms of private equity financing.
As competition for transactions increased PIPEs became an attractive means for investors
to acquire convertible preferred securities of a company, which pay a small dividend and
convert into common equity at an agreed price.3 Compared to follow-on offerings, PIPEs
provide an efficient means for public companies to raise capital in amounts of less than
$100 million. 4 The discount offered on the price of new shares (5 percent to 15 percent off
of the market price of the shares) is generally less than the discount to the underwriter
(typically 20 percent to 30 percent) in a typical follow-on offering.
There are two general categories of PIPEs: traditional and structured. Traditional PIPEs
usually involve the sale of either common shares or convertible securities (which convert
into shares of common equity at a fixed rate). Traditional PIPE issuances typically represent
10 percent to 15 percent of the issuer's outstanding share capital.' These securities are sold
at a specified discount to the current market price of the issuer's listed shares, usually 5
percent to 15 percent. In addition, the investor usually receives warrants to purchase ad-
ditional shares typically at a discounted price.
Structured PIPEs usually involve the sale of convertible debentures or convertible pre-
ferred shares (where the conversion price is based on the future market price of the common
equity), convertible and common equity with a reset feature (where the share price or
conversion price is reduced at a later date if the share price goes below a certain threshold),
fluctuating convertibles (where the conversion ratio fluctuates based on the market price
of the underlying shares), or structured equity lines (where the purchase price is linked to
the future market price of the common equity). The securities issued in a structured PIPE
frequently represent a larger percentage of the issuer's outstanding share capital than in a
traditional PIPE. However, as with traditional PIPEs, the securities are offered at a discount
2. Typical candidates for PIPEs are small-cap or mid-cap public companies (with market capitalizations
between $100 million and $1 billion) that cannot easily assume additional debt or obtain additional equity
capital from the public markets. In recent years, micro-cap issuers have been frequent recipients of PIPE
financings.
3. David Snow, The PIPEs, the PIPEs are Falling, PRIVATE EQUITY INT'L, Feb. 2002, at 14-15 [hereinafter
The PIPE].
4. The general rule for both public offerings of equity and debt securities is that they must be in an aggregate
amount of at least $75 million to $100 million in order for an effective and cost-efficient underwritten public
distribution to take place and for a secondary trading market in the securities to develop. Max Smith, Not a
PIPE Dream Anymore, SPECIALTY FIN., May 2002.
5. While PIPEs typically represent 10 percent to 15 percent of the share capital of an issuer, one of the
advantages of PIPEs is the flexibility of PIPE investors to fund smaller or larger capital needs. For example,
in October 1999, Buhrmann N.V. issued $350 million of convertible preferred shares, which was approximately
27 percent of Buhrmann's issued share capital prior to the transaction, and left the investors with a 22 percent
stake in the company. See Press Release, Dow JoNEs NEWS SERV., EU Commission OK's Buhrmann's Buy of
Corporate Express (Sept. 13, 1999) (on file with author). ASSA Abloy AB, a Swedish lock manufacturer, issued
10 million of its common shares to Swedish and foreign institutional investors, raising SK 1.26 billion, ap-
proximately 2 percent of its then-issued share capital. See Press Release, BLOOMBERO NEws, ASSA Abloy Raises
SKI.26 BLN in Share Sale for Besam Purchase (May 30, 2002) (on file with author).
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to the current market price of the issuer's publicly-traded securities and frequently the
investor receives warrants to purchase additional shares.
M. PIPES in Selected European Jurisdictions
The regulatory and legal regimes in the United States are more conducive to structuring
and consummating PIPE transactions than those in most European jurisdictions. This is
principally due to the prevalence of statutory pre-emptive rights and appeal, or challenge,
rights granted to many European shareholders.
Historically, neither European institutional investors nor public companies have rec-
ognized PIPEs as a viable investment or financing option for three reasons: (I) PIPEs in
key European jurisdictions are generally considered difficult to structure due to regula-
tory and/or legal barriers, (2) the European PIPE market is relatively underdeveloped in
terms of its level of experience and sophistication in overcoming the regulatory and/or
legal barriers, and (3) issuers and investors have been reluctant to consider PIPEs as a
legitimate financing or investment option due to the perceived negative results some
companies have experienced.
6
PIPEs began to appear in Europe with increasing frequency during the latter half of the
1990s.7 While the majority of early PIPEs consisted of ordinary share purchases or equity
line financings, they also included several convertible debt and convertible preferred PIPEs.
More recently, a small but significant number of publicly-listed Western European com-
panies have issued securities through PIPE transactions. Notwithstanding the evolution of
the European PIPE market, the European press has helped to limit their popularity by
portraying PIPEs as a financing alternative suitable only for small-cap issuers or for com-
panies that have no other financing sources.'
The factors that determine the speed with which an issuer can complete a PIPE are
similar in each European jurisdiction, namely, whether (1) an issuer has sufficient authorized
but unissued share capital, (2) the board of directors (or its equivalent) has been granted
the authority to issue shares without pre-emptive rights, and (3) the contemplated PIPE
structure is within the authority granted to the board of directors. In general, if each of the
foregoing conditions have been met, the parties will be able to structure a transaction that
capitalizes on two of the main benefits of PIPEs-speed and confidentiality.
A. ENGLAND
PIPEs are not common in England in large part due to (1) legal issues regarding share-
holder approval of new issues, (2) disapplication of pre-emptive rights, and (3) the effect of
6. Arguably, many PIPE financings have been made to issuers who were not suitable for the financing or
who went public too early in their development. Consequently, an issuer's poor performance after completing
a PIPE should not be attributed to the type of financing, but instead to the quality of the issuer. See Interview
with Harlan Kleiman, Chief Executive Officer of Shoreline Pacific, WALL ST. REP., July 31, 2001.
7. Daniel Green, Seeking a Backer Raising Capital is Never Easy, FIN. TIMES (London) May 9, 1994, § 4
(Survey of Biotechnology), at 11.
8. See, e.g., Timothy Sifert, Euro Cos. Warm to Equity Lines of Credit, TELETECH FIN. WEEK, Sept. 23, 2001;
The PIPEs, supra note 3. But see Dr. Marcus Labbe, PIPE Transactions (Private Investments in Public Entities) Will
Gain Momentum in Europe, at http://www.bfinance.co.uk (last visited Feb. 19, 2003) (on file with author).
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mandatory takeover rules.9 Furthermore, PIPEs are typically structured in ways that inten-
tionally contravene the Guidelines on Pre-emption (Guidelines) issued by the Investor
Protection Committee (IPC), a trade body of insurance companies and pension funds that
monitors their positions as shareholders and sets guidelines for member companies.'0 Al-
though the Guidelines are not law, they should be considered when structuring a PIPE for
an English company.
Most English PIPEs have involved micro-cap and small-cap technology companies seek-
ing to finance acquisitions, retire existing indebtedness, or to use the proceeds for general
corporate purposes-a common "catch-all." Equity line financing has emerged as the most
popular structure for PIPEs in England." Several English companies, such as Rage Software
plc, IQE plc, and SCI Entertainment Group plc completed equity line financings in 2001,
and Tadpole Technology plc and On-line plc were among the companies completing equity
lines in 2002. Although equity lines are increasingly popular in England, a handful of En-
glish issuers have completed convertible debt PIPEs. Companies such as Emerald Energy
plc and Danka Business Systems plc were among the English companies that have issued
convertible securities through PIPE transactions.
English companies that have taken on equity line financings have benefited from the
experience of U.S. issuers and have negotiated added protection for the company against
some of the more "toxic" aspects of PIPEs. 12 In June 2001, Rage Software plc (Rage), a
9. While listed companies in England are allowed under section 95 of the Companies Act 1985, as amended
by the Companies Act 1989 (Companies Act), to disapply the pre-emptive rights granted under section 89 of
the Companies Act, London Stock Exchange rules and Investor Protection Committee (IPC) Guidelines on
Pre-emption require that companies seek a "disapplication entitlement" from their shareholders, which must
be reviewed annually. See Companies Act 1985, §§ 89 & 95 (Eng.) (as amended by Companies Act 1989);
Investor Protection Committee, GUIDELINES ON PRE-EMPTION (issued Oct. 21, 1987) [hereinafter GUIDELINES];
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE LISTING RULES, para. 9.20 [hereinafter LISTING RUiLES]. Moreover, issuances under
the entitlement are restricted to 5 percent each year and 7.5 percent over any three-year period of issued
ordinary share capital. GUIDELINES, supra, §§ 2.1 & 6.1. Any issuances exceeding those percentages must either
be preceded by a rights offering or approved by the shareholders. GUIDELINES, supra, §§ 2.1& 6.1
10. Although the Guidelines are not law, the IPC, as a representative of institutional shareholders, exercises
a significant amount of influence over its members. Few institutional shareholders vote in contravention to the
recommendations made in the Guidelines. According to the Guidelines, shares offered under the disapplication
entitlement should be offered at a discount no greater than 5 percent of the middle of the best bid and offer
price immediately prior to the announcement of the offer. The definition of discount is the sum of "(a) the
amount by which the offering price differs from the market price, and (b) underwriters' gross spread and/or
sponsors' fees." Shareholders must approve any share issuance at a discount greater than 5 percent. GUIDELINES,
supra note 9, § 3.1.
11. See Sifert, upra note 8. Mr. Sifert asserts that equity lines are becoming more popular among European
telecommunications and technology companies, even though equity lines are a more expensive form of fi-
nancing than traditional credit facilities. Currently, very few financing options are available to telecommuni-
cations and technology issuers. If a company has a choice between a PIPE or a credit facility, it should opt for
the credit facility. However, for companies that are not household names nor in out-of-favor industries, the
choice may be between a PIPE financing or no financing at all.
12. So-called "death spirals" or "toxic PIPEs" are structured PIPEs in which a hedge fund, for example,
purchases convertible securities of an issuer at a predetermined discount to the market price. In some situations,
issuers have agreed to allow investors to sell their shares as soon as the registration statement becomes effective
while simultaneously permitting them to use the shares to cover short sales, leading a company into the so-
called "death spiral." The hedge fund short sells the shares driving the price of the security down and thereby
increasing the number of shares it will receive upon conversion. If the market price falls below the conversion
price set at the time of issuance, the conversion price is reset downward. Without a "floor" or trading restric-
tions imposed on the investor, the process is then repeated and the existing shareholders suffer substantial
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computer games developer and publisher listed on the London Stock Exchange, entered
into a £15 million equity line financing with Gem. The equity line allowed Rage to put its
shares to Gem over two years at a price per share equal to 90 percent of the average of the
closing bid prices of the ordinary shares during the fifteen days immediately following the
day Rage delivered a draw-down notice. With each draw-down, Gem received warrants to
subscribe to one-fourth the number of shares that it was required to purchase under the
equity line at the same price that it paid for the related equity line shares. The total amount
of shares that could be drawn under this facility was approximately 70 percent of Rage's
issued share capital at the date of the transaction; and although Rage was not required to
issue shares for less than £0.02 7 per ordinary share it was, however, required to meet min-
imum subscription levels of £2.2 million in the first seven months after completion and
£2.5 million per twelve-month period, or pay Gem the difference between the aggregate
subscription price of all ordinary shares subscribed in any twelve-month period and $2.5
million. If the equity line facility was fully utilized, Gem would have controlled roughly 40
percent of the voting power of Rage. However, Rage controlled the timing and amount of
the draw-downs and had the option to fulfill the minimum subscription requirements by
paying cash rather than issuing shares to Gem. Significantly, the agreement could be ter-
minated at any time by mutual consent and Rage was free to raise equity funds from other
sources when market conditions improved or other opportunities arose.
In September 2001, SCI Entertainment Group plc (SCI), a software design company
listed on the London Stock Exchange, entered into a £5 million equity line facility with
Gem similar to the Rage equity line financing completed earlier that year. SCI controlled
the timing and the maximum amount of any draw-downs and reserved the right to take
advantage of other fund-raising opportunities as they arose, other than a similar equity line
facility. By securing the right to control the timing of the draw-downs, capping the total
number of shares that could be drawn under the facility, and negotiating a floor on the issue
price, Rage, SCI, and other European equity line issuers were able to protect themselves
from the toxic PIPE phenomenon. The Rage and SCI equity line structures have become
standard for European equity lines."
Though not as common as equity lines, in recent years a number of English issuers have
executed deals involving convertible securities.' 4 Generally, English companies issue con-
vertible debentures with a three-year maturity and a small coupon (typically 2.5 percent
to 3 percent per annum). To date, the conversion terms have been standard, with the
dilution. Floorless PIPEs are viewed as a negative signal by investors that the company has run out of financing
options. See, e.g., Luisa Kroll, PIPE Dreamer, FORBES, Sept. 10, 2001, at 12. However, structured PIPEs rep-
resent a small portion of total PIPE transactions. See Bob Sechler, Sometbing Ventured. PIPE Dreams: Capitalists
Flood the Public Market, WALL ST. J. Online, Apr. 3, 2002, available at http://www.wsj.com (last visited Aug. 29,
2002).
13. See, e.g., Press Release, ADVFN.COM PLC, Draw Down Facility for £5 Million Equity Line of Credit
(Jan. 24, 2002) (on file with author); Press Release, ADVFN.COM PLC, Issue of Equity and Warrants (Feb.
20, 2002) (on file with author); Press Release, Glow Communications plc, Glow Communications plc An-
nounces Agreement to a £5 Million Equity Line of Credit (Jan. 11, 2002) (on file with author); see Press Release,
NetGem, Socift6 Grnrrale Puts in Place a Capital increase Facility of 30 million Euros in Favor of NetGem
(May 14, 2002) (on file with author); Press Release, Financial Times Information, ASM International An-
nounces Extension of US$65.0 Million Equity Line Agreement (July 5, 2002) (on file with author).
14. See, e.g., Emerald Energy, infra note 15; Press Release, Scoot.com plc, Scoot.com plc Acquisition of
Database Rights and up to £9.6 Million Private Placement of Unsecured Convertible Debentures (Mar. 1,
1999); Press Release, Scoot.com plc, £15.5 million Private Placement of Unsecured Convertible Debentures
and £2.9 million Final Draw Down Under Existing Convertible Debenture Arrangements (uly 22, 1999).
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debebtures converting into ordinary shares at either a fixed or floating rate, subject to a cap
on the number of shares that can be issued. Often the conversion rate is set at the lesser of
the share price at completion plus a premium, and a price based on recent market perfor-
mance prior to receipt of the conversion notice. Typically, the convertible debentures have
redemption clauses, which allow the company in certain circumstances to redeem the notes
with cash at a premium (usually 125 percent), or with shares based on their market price.
The redemption provision allows a company that has performed well to call the debentures
at the appropriate time and to maintain a certain degree of control over the number of
shares issued under the PIPE agreement.
An example of a typical convertible debt PIPE in England is the £6 million convertible
debt PIPE issued by Emerald Energy plc (Emerald) in February 1999. Emerald, an English
energy exploration and production company, issued convertible debentures with a 2.5 per-
cent coupon and a floating conversion rate to Gem in two tranches. At completion, the
ordinary shares underlying the convertible debentures represented approximately 13 per-
cent of Emerald's issued share capital. The debentures were convertible at a price equal to
the lesser of 140 percent of the market price at completion (3.5p) and the average of the
three lowest closing bid prices for the thirty days preceding the date of Gem's notice of
conversion. Gem received warrants for up to 10 percent of the total amount of the invest-
ment in two tranches, the exercise price of which was tied to the conversion price of the
relevant tranche of convertible debentures. Such provisions ensure a maximum conversion
price for the investor (4.9 p in this case), while at the same time tying the conversion price
to the company's share performance. In the event that Emerald's share price fell below a
certain threshold, Emerald had the option to redeem with cash that portion of the notes
that exceeded the agreed upon dilution floor. 5 Floor provisions, which have become a
standard term of convertible debt PIPEs, are designed to protect the company and its
shareholders from dilution of their share capital and against the risk of the death spiral.
More complex convertible preferred PIPEs have been done in England. These PIPEs
can be structured using ordinary shares or convertible preferred or debt securities with
highly negotiated terms. The type of investors attracted to this form of PIPE are medium-
term to long-term investors seeking more typical private equity terms including board
representation, dividends payable in cash or in kind, warrants, and liquidation preference.
As shareholder approval is required in England for capital increases, allotments of shares,
or amendment to the articles, complex PIPEs have proven less desirable.
1. Approval of New Issues and Disapplication of Statutory Pre-emptive Rights
Each shareholder of an English company has a statutory pre-emptive right over any newly
issued equity shares or debt securities convertible into any equity security issued for cash
consideration.16 Therefore, unless shareholders waive their pre-emptive rights under sec-
15. In the case of Emerald Energy, any conversion that would result in the conversion of the notes at 65
percent of the market price at completion triggered the anti-dilution provisions. Press Release, Emerald Energy
plc, Prospectus Relating to Proposed Placing and Open Offer by Teather & Greenwood Limited of up to 316,
720,618 New Ordinary Shares of Ip each at 3 /2p per share and Subscription of up to £6 million Convertible
Loan Notes with Warrants (Feb. 3, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Emerald Energy].
16. Companies Act 1985, § 89 (Eng.) (as amended by Companies Act 1989). In the case of a convertible
preferred security in England, pre-emptive rights attach not to the preferred security, but to the underlying
ordinary share into which it is convertible. Pre-emptive rights do not attach as a matter of the operation of the
Companies Act to new issues for which no cash consideration will be paid, such as a bonus share or dividend
share allotment.
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tion 95 of the Companies Act, securities cannot be issued in a PIPE transaction without
first being offered to existing shareholders.'
Listed company shareholders in England frequently pass a resolution giving the directors
the authority to allot shares equal to between 5 percent and 10 percent of the company's
share capital in accordance with section 80 of the Companies Act at the annual general
meeting. Usually the authority to allot shares is coupled with the authority to disapply pre-
emptive rights in respect of between 5 percent and 10 percent of the company's share capital
in accordance with section 95 of the Companies Act. If the board of directors does not have
the requisite pre-existing authorization, the PIPE is structured to require more shares than
the pre-approved limit, or the transaction is not otherwise within the authority granted
to the board, the board must obtain shareholder approval of a capital increase and a disap-
plication of pre-emptive rights.
In order to disapply pre-emptive rights, the board of directors must recommend the
resolution to its shareholders and deliver to its shareholders a written statement by the
board of directors stating the reasons for making the recommendation, the amount of
consideration to be paid to the company, and the directors' "justification" of that amount."
Non-pre-emptive issues of more than 10 percent become problematic under the Guidelines,
which address, among other things, the shareholder approval process, limits on exercise of
the disapplication entitlement, discounts at which shares can be offered, monitoring re-
quirements, and the form of ordinary and special shareholder resolutions. 9 In theory, the
more that a PIPE offering differs from the provisions set forth in the Guidelines, the more
difficult it will be to obtain shareholder approval for such issuances.
2. Mandatory Takeover Offer Rules
In England, care must be taken to structure PIPEs so as not to trigger the key provisions
of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (City Code). 20 If the offered securities, in the
aggregate, have greater than 29.9 percent of the voting rights of the company or an investor
acquires more than 29.9 percent of the voting rights of a company, rule 9 of the City Code
requires the investor to make a general cash offer to all holders of any class of equity security
in the company at the highest price paid by the investor or any person acting in concert
with the investor over the last twelve months." Given the high ownership thresholds in-
volved, the risk of triggering rule 9 is not likely in most PIPE transactions. Moreover, the
use of "floors" to control the price at which shares are issued, the ability of the company
to seek alternative sources of financing as they become available, and the ability of the
company to pay the investor in cash, rather than in shares, are features of most English
PIPEs that prevent the inadvertent application of these requirements.
3. Private Placement and Listing in England
An issuer must place the securities with the investors in a non-public offering in accor-
dance with the Public Offers of Securities Regulations 1995 (Regulations). An "offer to the
17. If a pre-emptive offer is made it must remain open for twenty-one days. Companies Act, §§ 89-90.
18. Companies Act, § 95(5).
19. GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 6.1.
20. CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, Rule 9 [hereinafter CIT CODt].
21. Id. Persons are acting in concert when under an agreement or understanding (whether formal or infor-
mal) they actively cooperate, through the acquisition by any of them of shares in a company, to obtain or
consolidate control of that company.
SPRING 2003
30 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
public" is defined as an offer to persons in England, or any section of the public (e.g.,
existing security holders of a corporate entity).22 A private placement can be accomplished
by using an exemption to the public offering rules. The exemptions most likely to be used
in PIPE transactions would be offers: (1) to institutional investors, (2) to less than fifty
persons, (3) to a limited number of "sophisticated" investors, or (4) with a high minimum
subscription or minimum denomination.23
In England, unlike in the United States, if the privately placed securities are ordinary
shares, the ordinary shares (or if the securities are convertible into ordinary shares, the
underlying shares) must be approved and admitted to the Official List of the London Stock
Exchange prior to or at the same time the shares are issued. Upon admission to the Official
List of the London Stock Exchange, these shares will be freely tradable. Short-term inves-
tors will seek to negotiate as few contractual restrictions on trading the company's shares
as possible. At completion, investors will be free to trade the shares or to hold them for
investment.2 4 If, however, the privately placed securities are of a class for which the issuer
has not obtained registration or listing, the parties will seek to negotiate appropriate exit
strategies. The goals of the investors will determine the focus and terms of the exit oppor-
tunities they seek. For example, investors with short-term investment horizons, such as
hedge funds, will typically seek to negotiate as short a lock-up period as possible and will
view selling the shares on the open market as the only exit route. However, investors with
a medium-term to long-term strategy, such as private equity funds, will tend to look at
more traditional private placement exit strategies. These strategies can include seeking
American-style registration rights if the issuer has substantial interests in the United States
or wishes to increase its liquidity by listing its shares in the United States, but are more
likely to include a requirement to list the new class of shares on the London Stock Exchange
within a specified amount of time.
B. GERMANY
Based upon available public information, relatively few PIPE transactions have been
completed by German issuers. Examples include: a E1.0 billion convertible bond issuance
completed by Allianz AG, a large-cap multinational insurance and asset management com-
pany, in November 2001; a C34.5 million private placement of ordinary shares completed
by Suss MicroTec, a small-cap microelectronics manufacturer, in January 2002; a E10.62
million private placement of ordinary shares by IXOS Software AG, a German software
company, in August 2002; a E4.0 million private placement of ordinary shares in Advanced
Medien, a German film rights buyer; and a handful of equity line financings.2" The principal
22. Public Offers of Securities Regulations 1995, § 6 (Eng.) [hereinafter Regulations].
23. An investor must notify the company when it acquires 3 percent or more of the share capital of a public
company and any changes in ownership interests of I percent thereafter. Companies Act 1985, § 98 (Eng.) (as
amended by Companies Act 1989). A listed company so notified must in turn notify the Company Announce-
ments Office. LISTING RULES, supra note 9, at 9.11-9.14.
24. Such an investor will typically require a representation to the effect that the company has not disclosed
any price sensitive information to it, the purpose of which is to maintain its position as a non-insider and its
freedom to trade the shares as it desires.
25. German equity line financings have been made to small-cap internet, technology and entertainment
companies. The facilities tend to be relatively small, ranging between 5-10 million. See, e.g., Metabox: Investors
Pay in DM 12M, BORSEN-ZEITUNG, Mar. 6, 2001 (on file with author); Bret Okeson, Micrologica says Investment
will be less than Expected, Delayed, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Frankfurt), Feb. 22, 2001 (on file with author); Press
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regulatory barriers limiting the popularity of PIPEs in Germany include: (1) shareholder
approval of new issues and the exclusion of statutorily based pre-emptive rights, (2) dis-
senting shareholders' rights, and (3) board members' personal liability.
German public companies have a two-tiered management structure that consists of a
supervisory board and a management board16 The supervisory board is made up of rep-
resentatives of significant shareholders, other outside directors who may have relevant in-
dustry knowledge, and, in some cases, employee representatives. The supervisory board
monitors the management board, has certain information rights, and can hold veto rights
over extraordinary events, but may not give directions to the management board with re-
spect to the day-to-day management of the company. 7 The management board of a public
company is an independent body that oversees the day-to-day operations of the company.2"
The management board is appointed by the supervisory board, but supervisory board mem-
bers representing a single class of securities in principle do not have the right to appoint
members of the management board as long as the articles of association do not provide
otherwise. 9 Both boards must approve any PIPE transaction.
1. Approval of New Issue and Exclusion of Statutory Pre-emptive Rights
Under German law, each shareholder has statutory pre-emptive rights over any newly
issued shares, regardless of whether they hold ordinary or preferred securities.3 0 According
to the German Stock Corporation Act (GSCA), all shareholders must be treated equally.
In the case of a capital increase, each shareholder has the right to subscribe for its pro-rata
portion of any newly issued shares as long as such pre-emptive right is not explicitly ex-
cluded. Shareholder approval for the capital increase and for exclusion of the pre-emptive
rights must be obtained at a shareholders' meeting.3'
An issuer can obtain a capital increase in two ways: by an "ordinary" share capital increase,
whereby shareholders approve the negotiated terms and conditions of a new issue to a
specific investor; or by an "authorized" share capital increase, whereby shareholders grant
the management board authority to negotiate the terms of a new investment and to issue
the newly authorized shares to an unspecified investor without further shareholder action.32
Both procedures have certain common features: (1) each can be used to authorize an in-
crease in an existing class of securities or to create a new class of securities; (2) notice of a
special shareholders' meeting must be published in the federal journal and other newspapers
Release, Micrologica, New Private Investor Boasts Liquidity (Feb. 22, 2001) (on file with author); Vika Bekker,
Popnet Says U.K Investors Bought EU 10 MLN in Shares, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Frankfurt), Mar. 14, 2002 (on file
with author); Press Release, Spendid me dien AG, Investment Fund Getting on Board at Splendid Medien
(May 2, 2001) (on file with author).
26. Supervisory board members are appointed by the shareholders' meeting and generally serve staggered
terms of roughly five years, subject to removal by shareholders. Management board members also serve five-
year terms, subject to removal by the supervisory board (not shareholders).
27. GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT of Sept. 6, 1965, as last amended by Act ofJune 19, 2002.
28. Id. § 76.
29. Pursuant to section 101 of the German Stock Corporation Act, the articles of association of a stock
corporation can provide that individual shareholders or shareholders representing a specific class of shares are
entitled to appoint up to one-third of the supervisory board members.
30. GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT § 186.
31. If pre-emptive rights are not to be excluded, a pre-emptive offer to shareholders must remain open for
at least two weeks. Id. § 186(1).
32. Id. §§ 182,202.
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(or mailed to shareholders if the shares are registered shares) at least four weeks in advance;
(3) at least 75 percent of the shares duly represented in person or by proxy at a properly
composed shareholder meeting must vote in favor of the increase; and (4) no prospectus is
required in connection with the proposal to approve the issuance of the new securities.
PIPE transactions, by their nature, are more likely to be facilitated by an authorized share
capital increase than by an ordinary share issuance. The GSCA permits an issuer's man-
agement board to establish "storage" authorized share capital. 3 Shareholders may authorize
the issuance of additional equity in an aggregate amount not to exceed 50 percent of the
value of the outstanding share capital on the date the shareholder resolution is passed. Such
shareholder authorization is valid for five years. In addition, provided the issuer complies
with certain conditions during the five-year period, the issuer may issue new shares for
capital investment in relation to which pre-emptive rights may be excluded.
Section 186 of the GSCA explicitly allows for the exclusion of pre-emptive rights when
the following two conditions are met: (1) the increase in capital is for cash consideration
and does not exceed 10 percent of the outstanding share capital, and (2) the issue price for
the new securities (or the securities into which they are convertible) is not substantially
lower than the current stock exchange price for the quoted securities. The meaning of
"substantially below market value" is unclear; however, the current view suggests that a
range of 3 percent to 5 percent is acceptable.34 Even though capital increases with an ex-
clusion of pre-emptive rights in excess of 10 percent are not prohibited by this provision,
issuances of more than 10 percent of the outstanding share capital of a company are more
likely to draw a shareholder appeal.3"
It is common for large-cap and mid-cap companies to establish a shareholder resolution
that authorizes new issuances of share capital, without pre-emptive rights, on terms to be
negotiated by the management board and subject to the approval of the supervisory board.
It is less common for small-cap issuers to establish this type of "storage" authorization.
Provided that substantial negotiations with a potential investor have not yet occurred, even
a small company's management board can request that the shareholders authorize additional
share capital in very broad terms and exclude shareholders' statutory pre-emptive rights.
Such a resolution would typically authorize the company's management board to look for
potential investors and to negotiate the specific terms of the newly authorized shares with
the board. The resolution would also typically empower the supervisory board to amend
the company's articles of association upon the issuance of any new shares, including pre-
ferred shares, to reflect such new issuance.
2. Dissenting Shareholders' Rights and Personal Liability of Supervisory
and Management Boards
Once an agreement has been reached with a potential investor or group of investors
regarding the terms of and conditions to the issuance of the securities out of the authorized
33. Id. § 202.
34. Hiffer, Legal Commentary on the German Stock Corporation Act of Sept. 6, 1965 (as amended), § 186.
In Germany, if the discount to market price at which shares are issued is greater than 5 percent, there is a
greater chance that a shareholder will challenge the transaction's fairness. Supervisory board members of
German listed companies can be held personally liable under German law. GERMt STOCK CORPORATION ACT
of Sept. 6, 1965, § 116 (as last amended by Act of July 19, 2002). Therefore, it is likely that the issuer's board
may request a fairness opinion where the discount is greater than 5 percent.
35. In Germany, the mandatory takeover offer rules are triggered when a shareholder acquires control over
the company, meaning at least 30 percent of the voting rights of a company. Securities Acquisition and Takeover
Act of December 20, 2001 (as last amended by Act ofJuly 23, 2002), §§ 29(2), 35.
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share capital, both the company's management board and supervisory board must approve
the agreement by simple majority. Following such approval no further shareholder action
is required; however, the issuer is required to notify shareholders of the specific terms of
the securities that were issued at the next annual meeting. Prior to the next annual meeting,
the management and supervisory boards prepare a report to shareholders explaining the
terms of each such transaction.
The management board report must justify the decision to exclude the pre-emptive rights
of the existing shareholdersi6 Although board decisions are held to a prudent business-
person's standard, the members can be held personally liable under German law if the terms
and conditions of the agreement are not on an arm's length basis; in other words, the
management agrees to any terms and conditions that are not economically reasonable and,
therefore, places the company at an economic disadvantage versus the new investor. More-
over, in case of a dispute, the burden of proof that the terms of the PIPE were arm's length
rests with management.
37
While each shareholder has a right to challenge any shareholder resolution, the risk of
appeal is relatively low for two reasons: (1) a company's management board is explicitly
entitled by law to negotiate with third party investors and to issue new shares as long as it
is acting pursuant to a valid resolution, 38 and (2) a shareholder, in the event such shareholder
loses the appeal, faces the penalty of paying for all of the costs that the company incurs in
connection with defending against the claim.
3. Private Placement and Listing of the Shares in Germany
Newly issued shares do not come into existence in Germany until the respective capital
increase is registered on the Commercial Register. Once registered, new shares (of a class
previously admitted to trading) must also be registered with the Board Controlling the
Admission of Securities before they can be traded on the stock exchange.3 9 Unless a com-
pany can avail itself of an exemption, the company must, inter alia, submit an offering
memorandum before the newly issued shares will be admitted for trading.4
Shares issued in a PIPE must be placed with an investor in a transaction exempt from
the public offering requirements. Under German securities law, issuers are entitled to an
exemption for certain types of offerings if the shares are not initially traded on the stock
market but are directly offered to institutional investors. The most commonly used ex-
emptions are for offers (1) to persons who professionally and on a regular basis acquire or
dispose of securities on their own or another's account; (2) to other professional investors,
i.e., pension and investment funds; (3) for a minimum consideration or minimum denom-
ination of C40,000; or (4) that are part of an issue for which a sales prospectus has already
been published.
4 1
If the new shares are issued for immediate trading on the stock market, such shares are
exempt from prospectus delivery requirements if they are the same class as any securities
then listed on a domestic stock exchange, and their number, estimated market value, or
36. GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT of Sept. 6, 1965, § 186(4) (as last amended by Act ofJuly 19, 2002).
37. Id. § 93.
38. This principle was recently confirmed by the German Supreme Court. BGHZ 136, p. 133.
39. German Act on Stock Markets, §§ 36-1 (as last amended July 9, 2001).
40. Id. § 30.
41. German Act on Offering Memoranda, § 2 (1998).
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nominal value is less than 10 percent of the corresponding value of the same class admitted
to trading on a domestic stock exchange. 4 However, to be exempt from the prospectus
delivery requirements, investors must have access to the most recent financial information
that a sales prospectus would contain.
C. THE NETHERLANDS
PIPE transactions for Dutch issuers, especially equity line financings, are becoming in-
creasingly prevalent due to legal and regulatory requirements that are less burdensome than
in other European jurisdictions. The primary legal issues to consider while structuring a
PIPE in the Netherlands relate to shareholder approval of a capital increase and new issue
and the waiver of pre-emptive rights. Unlike England and many continental European
jurisdictions, the mandatory takeover legislation recently adopted in the Netherlands does
not apply to securities issued in PIPE transactions.
PIPE issuers in the Netherlands are mostly mid-cap to large-cap companies from a range
of industries that are in need of financing to fund acquisitions, expand product markets,
and to restructure or retire existing debt. Dutch issuers have completed convertible pre-
ferred, convertible debt, and ordinary share PIPEs in amounts ranging from approximately
E12 million to E350 million.41
Some of the most complex PIPEs completed in Europe have been issued by Dutch
companies. One of the first preferred share transactions in the Netherlands, structured as
a PIPE, was completed by Buhrmann N.V. (Buhrmann), a Dutch office products company
listed on the Euronext Amsterdam Stock Exchange. The $3 50 million convertible preferred
deal was completed in October 1999. The convertible preferred shares were issued to Apollo
Management, L.P and Bain Capital in order to finance the acquisition of Corporate Ex-
press, a Colorado-based office products manufacturer. The transaction gave Apollo and
Bain a 22 percent collective stake in Buhrmann.
1. Approval of New Issues and Exclusion of Statutory Pre-emptive Rights
Dutch corporate law generally grants each shareholder statutory pre-emptive rights over
certain newly issued shares.44 Holders of ordinary shares or preferred shares have pre-
emptive rights over new issuances of shares of the same class as the shares they hold or over
warrants to acquire shares of the class they hold. Shareholders do not, however, have pre-
emptive rights over issuances of a new class of shares if the new shares are not convertible
into an existing class of securities. Therefore, shareholders will often be required to waive
their rights of pre-emption under section 96(a) of the Netherlands Civil Code in order for
a company to issue securities in a PIPE transaction without first conducting a rights offering
to its shareholders.4
5
42. German Regulation Regarding the Admittance of New Shares for Trading, § 45 (3b) (1998 as last
amended June 21, 2002).
43. See Tie Uses Navigator's Credit Facility, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE, May 23, 2001, at 3; see, e.g., Konstantin
Richter & Erik Siemers, Buhrmann Buys U.S.'s Corporate Express, WALL ST. J. (Europe), July 14, 1999,
at 3.
44. NETHERLANDS Civ. CODE § 2:96a. Subsection I indicates that exceptions to the pre-emptive right will
be made inter alia when shares are issued (1) for non-cash contributions, (2) as the result of a merger, or (3) to
the employees of the company. Id. § 2:96(a)(i).
45. Id. § 2:96a. If the pre-emptive rights are not waived, shares must be offered to existing shareholders.
Pre-emptive offers of shares to existing shareholders must remain open for at least two weeks. Id. § 2:96a(5).
VOL. 37, NO. 1
STRUCTURING PIPE TRANSACTIONS IN KEY EUROPEAN JURISDICTIONS 35
As in Germany, Dutch law grants shareholders the ability to delegate to the management
board- the authority, once a capital increase has been authorized by the shareholders, to
issue new shares and to exclude pre-emptive rights in relation to the issuance of additional
shares of an existing classy1 The management board must first obtain supervisory board
approval before it can propose such a delegation of authority to the shareholders. 48 Listed
companies frequently authorize a resolution delegating to the management board the au-
thority to issue a specified number of additional shares without pre-emptive rights. This
delegation can remain valid for up to five years. 49 If the management board has not been
empowered with the requisite authority to issue additional shares, or the proposed trans-
action does not fall within the authority granted to the board, the board must obtain share-
holder approval for the capital increase and/or creation of a new class as well as the exclusion
of pre-emptive rights.50 This authorization is important to obtain as bypassing the share-
holder approval process significantly decreases the amount of time required to complete
a PIPE.
The powers granted to the management board pursuant to such a delegation of authority
are, however, constrained in several ways. First, the issuer's articles of association indicate
the authorized share capital. If the authorized share capital of the issuer is not sufficient to
issue additional shares of an existing class or does not contemplate a new class, shareholders
must approve an amendment of the articles to increase the authorized share capital and/or
authorize a new class of shares before any share issuance may occur."' Second, shareholders
typically will not empower the management board to create a new class of shares without
their prior approval. Furthermore, the supervisory board would also have to approve the
creation of a new class of equity securities as such an action is not an ordinary course
corporate transaction. 2
2. Mandatory Takeover Rules
Since September 2001, takeovers have been governed by the 1995 Act of the Supervision
of the Securities Trade (1995 Securities Act) and the Decree on the 1995 Supervision of
the Securities Trade." However, these rules do not apply to transactions where the acquiror
receives shares through an issuance, such as a PIPE financing.
3. Private Placement and Listing in the Netherlands
An issuer must place the securities with investors in an exempt offering in accordance
with the 1995 Securities Act. The 1995 Securities Act contains a general prohibition of
46. The Netherlands has a two-tiered management structure comparable to that of Germany. Under Dutch
law, only a Naamloze Vennootschap (N.V.) that qualifies as a "large" N.V. must have a supervisory board. In
general, a listed company will be a large N.V. for purposes of Dutch law.
47. Id. § 2:96.
48. If the debt securities are convertible into an existing class of shares, if the issuer has sufficient authorized
share capital and the shareholders have already delegated the right to issue ordinary shares or another existing
class of shares without pre-emptive rights to the directors, shareholder approval is not needed. Supervisory
board approval, however, would be required.
49. Id. § 2:96 subsection 1.
50. Id. § 2:96.
51. If requested, shareholders must be given the full text of any proposed amendments to the articles of
association free of any costs.
52. Id. § 2:164 subsection I.
53. Until September 2001, the Social and Economic counsel had administered a "non-binding" code of
conduct with respect to takeover transactions.
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offerings upon issue and certain secondary offerings without an applicable exemption. The
private placement aspect of a PIPE can be effected in the Netherlands by taking advantage
of certain general exemptions, such as offers to professional investors (natural persons and
legal entities that trade or invest in securities in the course of their profession or business),14
offers to persons outside the Netherlands," offers of new securities of the same class of
security that is listed on the Euronext, or offers for a minimum denomination/subscription
amount.
5 6
If the privately placed securities are listed shares of an existing class, those shares must
be listed on the stock exchange prior to or at the same time that the shares are issued and
are then freely tradable. In the case of preferred share PIPEs, such as Buhrmann's, the
issuer must list the ordinary shares underlying the convertible securities on the Euronext
no later than the completion date. The Buhrmann investors had the right to require the
issuer to list the preferred shares on the Euronext if the shares met the stock exchange
listing requirements and to obtain a U.S. stock exchange listing within two years of the
closing date.
D. FRANCE
Although still considered a relatively new financing vehicle in France, PIPE financings
are gaining popularity in particular for companies that are in recognized financial diffi-
culty.5 7 However, as with other European jurisdictions, there are significant legal issues to
consider in structuring a PIPE in France, including: (1) obtaining approval for a capital
increase and new issue and exclusion of shareholders' statutory preferential (i.e., pre-
emptive) rights over newly issued shares; (2) obtaining approval of the transaction by the
Commission des Opirations de Bourse (COB), the equivalent of the SEC; (3) complying with
reporting obligations; and (4) depending on the structure and size of the PIPE issuance
relative to an issuer's outstanding share capital, structuring the transaction so as not to
implicate the French mandatory takeover offer rules. Notwithstanding the legal issues to
be contemplated, several French issuers have recently completed equity line or convertible
debt PIPEs."8
In January 2002 Genset, a French genomics company trading on the Noveau Marche,
issued 4,000,000 BSA (bon de souscription d'actions) warrants to Soci&6t Gn6rale Cowen,
with each warrant convertible into one share of Genset at a conversion price equal to 90
percent of the average trading value of the share, subject to adjustments Genset controlled
the timing and amount of any conversions, subject to a two-year E15 million minimum
54. Restrictive language must be included in the offering document. Act on the Supervision of Securities
Trade, § 2 (1995).
55. Restrictive language and filing with the Authority for the Financial Markets in the Netherlands is re-
quired. Id. § 3.
56. A copy of the offering circular must be submitted to the Authority for the Financial Markets before the
offering is made. Id. § 4.
57. Joshua Jaffe, Viventures in France's Second PIPE, THE DAILY DEAL, May 4, 2002. However, Mr. Jaffe
neglects to account for the equity line completed by Genset in early 2002. See Genset SA, infra note 59.
58. See, e.g., Press Release, Highwave Optical Technologies, Highwave Optical Raises €32 .Million (Jan. 30,
2002), available at www.highwave-tech.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2003). Highwave issued 32 Million in con-
vertible bonds to Newbury Ventures, Technoventures, and DB Capital Partners injanuary 2002, in conjunction
with a shareholders agreement giving board representation rights to the investors.
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conversion requirement. The transaction was concluded subsequent to shareholders waiv-
ing their pre-emptive rights to both the BSA warrants and the shares issued pursuant to
their exercise. The transaction also required a visa from the French securities regulation
authority approving the documents filed pursuant to the transaction. 59
Unlike in the United States where equity lines are structured as a part of an issuer's
securities, in France, the equity line is structured as a call on warrants. The issuer is entitled
to require the investor to exercise its warrants over a period, typically two to two and a half
years. Furthermore, French regulations limit the volume and frequency of share issues and
sales based on factors linked to the price and volume of the shares traded on the market,
in addition to any floors or limits negotiated by the issuers.-
The most common issuers of PIPEs in France are technology companies. The market
capitalization of issuers has ranged from the micro-cap to mid-cap, raising anywhere from
E7 to E32 million to fund external growth or product development, to retire existing debt,
or to serve general corporate purposes. 6' Generally, the investor group in a PIPE trans-
action consists of between one and three short-term investors acquiring from 7 percent
to more than 40 percent of a company's share capital and expecting to sell the shares in
the near term.62
1. Approval of New Issues and Exclusion of Statutory Preferential Rights
A guiding principle under French law is that all shareholders must be treated equally.
Consequently, in the case of a capital increase against cash consideration, each shareholder
has the right to a pro-rata subscription (droitprif6rentiel de souscription) for any new shares.63
The preferential right extends to newly issued ordinary or preference shares as well as
convertible bonds and debt instruments with an attached right to subscribe to equity shares
of the company.-
Despite the overarching principle of equality, it is common for the shareholders of French
companies to empower the directors to issue shares and to disapply statutory preferential
rights, thus allowing the directors to move quickly in the event of a financing or acquisition
opportunity. Shareholders may disapply statutory preferential rights in favor of the public
at large or for the benefit of identified beneficiaries. 6 5
In order to complete a PIPE in France, the issuer needs an authorization for the directors
to issue additional shares without preferential rights. This authorization must also (1) del-
egate the authority to the board to issue shares up to the authorized amount when appro-
priate on terms and conditions determined by the directors, and (2) empower the directors
59. See Press Release, Genset SA, Genset Announces New Agreement for up to 30 Million Euros Equity
Line (Nov. 28, 2001) (on file with author).
60. Regulation No. 90-04.
61. Cast Software SA raised E7 million by issuing convertible bonds to Vivenrure Partners in a May 2002
PIPE. See Jaffe, supra note 57.
62. LVL Medical completed an equity line PIPE in February 2002 for 7 percent of its issued share capital.
See Press Release, LVL Medical, A Credit Line of Eur 21 Million (Feb. 27, 2002) (on file with author),
http://www.lvl-medical.com/uk/avis/02/uk 270202.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2003). Highwave Optical's 
€32
million PIPE represented 45 percent of its issued share capital at the close of the transaction. See Highwave
Optical Technology, supra note 58.
63. Code de Commerce [C. Com.] art. L225-132 (Fr.).
64. Id. arts. L225-151, L225-161.
65. Id. art. L225-135.
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to amend the articles of association to reflect the capital increase.6 Otherwise, at an ex-
traordinary shareholder meeting, the issuer must obtain shareholder approval for a capital
increase by a two-thirds vote.67 When a capital increase or a withdrawal of preferential
rights is to be considered, both the board of directors and the statutory auditors must
provide a report to shareholders. Those reports must include, inter alia, detailed information
on the capital increase; the reasons for proposing the capital increase and withdrawing
preferential rights; the impact of the issuance of the new shares on existing shareholders;
the entity to whom shares are to be issued; the number of shares to be issued; and the price
of the shares, if known, or alternatively, the method used to determine the share price.
68
Article L22 5-138 m of the French Commercial Code permits shareholders to authorize
a capital increase in favor of identified beneficiaries and to delegate the right to issue new
shares on the basis of this authorization for a period not to exceed two years. 69 When the
preferential rights have been waived by shareholders of a listed company for the benefit of
unidentified beneficiaries, the shares must be issued at a price not less than the average
market price of the shares during ten consecutive days selected from among the twenty
days preceding the day of the issuance.70 Reference to an average market price is not re-
quired when the issue of shares is made in favor of identified beneficiaries, which may be
the case for certain PIPEs.
2. Complying with Reporting Obligations
In France, investors must comply with reporting obligations relating to the acquisition
of shares in excess of a specified percentage of a company's share capital or voting rights.7"
Any individual or entity that holds, whether acting alone or in concert with others, more
than 5 percent, 10 percent, 20 percent, 33.33 percent, 50 percent, or 66.66 percent of the
capital or voting rights of a publicly-listed French company must immediately report to the
company (within fifteen calendar days of the acquisition) and to the Conseil des Marchs
Financiers (CMF) (within five trading days of the acquisition) the exact amount of shares
held.72 In addition, when the shareholder has reached the 10 percent or 20 percent thresh-
old, the shareholder must declare its intent as to the acquisition of additional stock in the
company for the succeeding twelve months.7 3 A failure to disclose triggers both civil and
criminal penalties. The shares that exceed the threshold and should have been disclosed are
deprived of voting rights until proper disclosure is made and for two years following such
disclosure.74 In addition, a commercial court acting at the request of the company, a share-
holder, or the COB may decide to suspend for a maximum of five years all or part of the
66. In principle, the articles of association can only be amended by the shareholders at an extraordinary
meeting. However, in the event of a capital increase, shareholders can delegate to the board the necessary
powers to determine the conditions, the amount, the timing of such increase, and the power to amend the
articles. Companies listed on a regulated market are allowed to have their board sub-delegate these powers to
their chairmen. Id. art. L225-129.
67. Id. art. L225-96.
68. Decree n' 67-236 of Mar. 23, 1967, art. 155.
69. Code de Commerce [C. Com.] art. L225-138 (Fr.).
70. Id. art. L225-136, 2'.
71. Id. art. L233-7.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. art. 233-14(1).
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voting rights of the shareholder who failed to disclose.7" After the COB advises, the share-
holder who failed to disclose or its managers may be required to pay a E18,000 fine. 6
3. Mandatory Takeover Offer Rules
In France, the mandatory takeover rules may impact a PIPE transaction for a large
equity stake of the company in two ways: first, if, as a result of a PIPE transaction, a
person, entity, or a group of persons acting in concert77 acquires more than one-third of
the capital stock or voting rights of a publicly-listed company;7 8 and second, if, following
a PIPE transaction, a person, entity or a group of persons acting alone or in concert, who
already hold directly or indirectly between 33 percent and 50 percent of the total number
of equity securities or voting rights of a company, increases such holdings by 2 percent
or more of the company's total equity securities or voting rights within a period of less
than twelve consecutive months. In both instances, the shareholder(s) must make the
mandatory offer for all the outstanding shares and any other securities with rights to
subscribe to the shares of the company on terms and conditions acceptable to the CMF7 9
Careful structuring of the investment terms and the use of floors (minimum conversion
price) and ceilings to control the price at which shares can be issued in any PIPE trans-
action will prevent the trigger of the mandatory takeover offer rules. The CMF may
grant a waiver to the mandatory takeover rule under certain circumstances, including a
subscription to a capital increase by a company in recognized financial difficulty, subject
to the approval of a general meeting of its shareholders1s
4. COB Special Recommendation on Equity Lines
On July 25, 2001, the COB issued a special recommendation on equity lines. The COB
also set up a working group whose task was to evaluate (1) the compatibility of equity lines
with French law and (2) the importance of such operations for French financial markets.
The COB published the report prepared by the group on September 4, 2002.81
Under the special recommendation the COB indicated that certain conditions should be
met in establishing equity lines, particularly in terms of disclosure of information to the
public. The COB indicated that it will approve equity lines only if:
75. Id. art. 233-14(4).
76. Id. art. 247-2(1).
77. Acting in concert means persons who have entered into an agreement to acquire or transfer some voting
rights or to exercise voting rights in order to carry on a common program in a company. The agreement need
not be in writing. There is a presumption of an action in concert, which can be rebutted, when the agreement
is between a company and its directors, companies controlled by the same entity, or a parent and its subsidiaries.
Unrelated entities can be deemed as acting in concert, particularly if they have signed a shareholders' agreement.
Id. art. 233-10.
78. MON TARV & FINANCE CODE art. L433-3(l) (Fr.). The CMF may grant a waiver to the mandatory
takeover rule under certain circumstances, which include a subscription to a capital increase by a company in
recognized financial difficulty, subject to the approval of a general meeting of its shareholders. C.M.F. RkGLE-
ME.-r GitgRAL art. 5.7. In addition, in the case of transactions subject to the approval of the company's
shareholders, the CMF can rule on a waiver application before a general meeting is held, provided that it has
precise information about the envisaged transaction. Id. art. 5.5.8.
79. C.M.F. RiGLEMENT G9N9RAL art. 5.5.2.
80. Id. art. 5.5.7. In addition, in transactions subject to shareholder approval, the CMF can rule on a waiver
application before a general meeting is held, provided that it has precise information about the envisaged
transaction. Id. art. 5.5.8.
81. See COB, Press Release, Sept. 4, 2002, presenting the Rapport do groupe de travail sur les nouvelles
formes d'augmentation du capital, preside par Jean-Francois Lepetit.
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" The market is clearly informed, before the mechanism is set up, that the capital in-
creases are to be mainly and ultimately financed by the market,
" The market is given prior notice before each pricing reference period begins,
" The intermediary acting between the issuer and the market refrain from any interven-
tion in the issuer's securities during the reference periods, and
" The same intermediary refrains from any pre-sales of subscribed securities and any
direct or indirect hedging, prior to the effective subscription of the securities."2
In order to simplify existing procedures and increase flexibility for companies in need of
funding, the working group suggested creating an equity line program, which would permit
shares issuances of up to 10 percent of the company's share capital over any eighteen month
period. Such a program would require a prospectus subject to the COB's approval. Each
capital increase could be structured as a private or public placement at the option of the
issuer. In the event of a public offering, a simplified prospectus would have to be submitted
to the COB. Otherwise, the public would be informed of the private placement by a press
release.
5. Prospectus Approval by the COB and Listing in France
Before completing a PIPE transaction, issuers must prepare a prospectus for approval
by the COB, which must be obtained prior to the shareholders' meeting granting approval
of the PIPE.8 3 In addition, the issuer must give prior notice to the market before each
pricing reference period begins.8 4 New shares issued in a PIPE transaction must be ad-
mitted for trading. If the shares are of the same class as the company's currently listed
shares, then the issuer could be exempted from preparing a prospectus because one has
already been filed."
Generally an issuer must prepare a prospectus for approval by the COB with respect to
a PIPE prior to or at the time of listing the issued securities on the relevant regulated
market.86 However, an issuer may submit a less burdensome document stating the terms
and conditions of the securities to be issued as well as the reasons for the transaction under
certain conditions." The exemption to the obligation to prepare a prospectus is not available
where, as the result of the proposed transaction, (1) the issuer's share capital will be in-
creased two-fold or more, (2) the issuer's share capital is increased by at least 50 percent
and implies a change of control or an important change in the business carried out by the
issuer, or (3) there is a significant change in the structure of the balance sheet of the issuer.8
82. COB Special Recommendation dated July 25, 2001.
83. COB REGULATION n' 98-01, art. 12-1.
84. See COB Special Recommendation, saupra note 82, at n.I 11.
85. COB REGULATION n' 98-01.
86. Id.
87. COB REGULATION n' 98-01, art. 12-3. The conditions are as follows: (1) the general meeting that has
authorized the transaction has received sufficient information regarding the proposed issuance and has been
held less than one year before the date of listing of the relevant securities on the stock exchange; (2) the securities
to be issued correspond to less than 10 percent of the securities of the same category already listed on a regulated
stock exchange, in number, estimated share exchange value or nominal value; and (3) the issuer has complied
with all its information obligations and the quality of the information provided is considered satisfactory by
the COB.
88. COB REOULATION n' 98-01, art. 13.
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IV. Conclusion
PIPEs appear to be gaining favor in Europe due in large part to unstable capital markets,
tight bank lending requirements, and the increasing popularity of PIPEs in the United
States and elsewhere. In addition, larger and more financially stable companies, such as
Allianz AG and Buhrmann N.V, have chosen to do PIPEs when other financing alternatives
were available, which lends credibility to the PIPE structure becoming a mainstream fi-
nancing alternative. There is a growing interest in PIPEs in Western Europe as evidenced
by the increasing number of PIPEs that are being consummated in key European jurisdic-
tions and the fact that funds with the primary purpose of investing in PIPEs are being
formed. 9 Investment banks are beginning to actively pitch PIPEs to new and existing cli-
ents. Most significantly, jurisdictions like France recognize the importance of PIPEs in the
marketplace and are taking steps to facilitate companies and investors completing certain
types of PIPE transactions.
89. See, e.g., Frank Kane, 'Greed is Good' Comes to London, THE OBSERVER, June 2, 2002, available at http://
www.observer.co.uk/business/story/O,6903,726003,00.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
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